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TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CRIMINAL VIOLENCE*
HANS TOCH**
In explaining the title of this paper, I must
qualify its ecumenical theme by noting that my
perspective is conditioned by membership in the
Subculture of the Clinician, though I am not a
core member. I agree with Sholom Aleichem, who
compared the mission of psychology to that of
parsley. "To look at it's not bad," he said, "itsmells
nice, tastes good when you flavor food with it. But
you try chewing parsley by itselfl ' In Aleichem's
terms, the goal of this paper is to discuss violence
menus that are flavored with parsley; to discuss the
impact of clinical thinking on the study of violence.
The assets of this approach, and its liabilities, are
relative (just as some spices can make unusual
chicken soup). Problems arise where disciplines are
stretched to apply to the domains of other disciplines.
We must start by recognizing that disciplinary
parochialism in our perspectives on crime and
violence is inevitable. Linkages between our perspectives are made more difficult by a tendency to
gravitate toward core assumptions in our own
fields, as opposed to areas of potential interface
between fields. This point was well put by Robert
Merton in a conference on delinquency in 1955.
Merton said:
In this bridge-building game... it is important to
keep in mind that the work of the sociologist tends
to concentrate on observing repetitive behaviors
involving large numbers of people. Consequently,
he is apt to be less sensitive to the highly individualized, idiosyncratic aspects of what he has observed.
Correlatively, the occupational task of most clinicians is to be extremely concerned with the idiosyncratic.
In consequence, by virtue of their occupations and
* This paper is a modified version of an address delivered at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in San Francisco.
Marvin Wolfgang and Travis Ilirschi have helped materially with the preparation of the manuscript, and I am
grateful to them.
** Professor of Psychology, School of Criminal Justice,
State University of New York at Albany; Ph.D. Princeton
University.
'Aleichem, Preamble, ALEICHEM, THE THREE WIDOWS,
reprinted in H. TocH, LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY
vii (1961).

ways of life, each of these two guilds (sociologists
and clinicians), which may share the same mode of
thought and the same objective, is none the less
cumulatively building up its own peculiar kind of
sensitivity. The result is a series of lopsided developments. Nevertheless, it is not wise to wait for a
scientist of man, his behavior and his works, one
who can adequately incorporate these varied sensitivities and, with boundless time and energy, can
move on these fronts at once. The tactic that could
be most helpful, it seems to me, would be for us to
join together and fuse our respective sensitivities
from time to time, but, in the main, to continue to
develop
the conceptions most pertinent to each
2
field.
I presume that a search for interfaces subserves
Merton's goal of "fusing our respective sensitivities
from time to time." With this in mind, I shall
discuss three violence-related problem areas in
which interdisciplinary fusion seems possible to me.
These areas are (1) the intersection of psychodynamics and social norms, (2) the prediction of
violence-chronicity, and (3) the design of violencepromotive (counter-therapeutic) and violence-reducing (therapeutic) settings.
PERSONAL MOTIVES AND SOCIAL NORMS

Macro-theorists map the prevalence of violence.
Their views are based on data about the distribution of violence over space and time among different groups of people. The clinician interacts with
individuals, and generally disregards their location
in statistical distributions. He tends to ignore the
question of whether his patient is idiosyncratic.
Herein lies a problem for both the clinician and
the macro-theorist. The clinician suffers because he
understates the contextual pressures bearing on
non-idiosyncratic offenders; the sociologist tends to
discount the role of psychodynamics by assuming
that clinicians examine only offenders occupying
the tail end of distributions or residual categories.
As a result, it becomes hard to fill the blanks in
violence theories that relate to the motives of violent offenders, and sociologists often attribute in2
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dividual behavior to generic stimuli (prevalent conditions in the outside world). To escape from this
emphasis on stimuli, it is helpful to examine two of
Wolfgang's propositions. The first is that violencepermissive and violence-promotive norms are prevalent in neighborhoods from which concentrations
of violent offenders emanate, and second, that
many offenders have 3internalized such norms, and
are affected by them.
This syllogism leaves two problems which may
ultimately be related. First, where emphasis is put
on the existence of social norms, in order to explain
behavior consonant with such norms, one cannot
accomodate the distinction between sets of "normexposed" individuals who behave according to prevailing norms, and those who do not. Unless the
normative conduct is universal (or unless it follows
F. H. Allport's J curve for conforming behavior),
there - re differences between individuals who have
internalized norms-or at least, translated norms
into conduct-and those who have not. Most explanations of the differences (except differential
association or exposure views) must include assumptions about the psychic makeup of the norm
adopter.
The second problem involves types and degrees
of-norm adoption. Macro-theorists locate subcultures where extreme statistical distributions exist.
This asually means that norm-relevant behavior is
not only prevalent, but also extreme enough to be
recorded. For example, we locate violence subcultures on the basis of homicide statistics. 4 But murderers, robbers, predatory delinquents, and other
statistically prominent individuals are not model
denizens of their neighborhoods. If the norms examined are cultural, they must prescribe behavior
that makes sense to members of the culture, and
have group approval. A cultural violence norm
plausibly tells the individual that he can react to
affronts or defend his manly honor; it cannot carry
the same point to extremes, and tell the person that
he must rape, rob, or kill. Such occurs only among
small, evanescent, and self-destructive subcultures,
such as the thuggees of British India, or the flagellants of the Middle Ages.5
3 M. WOLFGANG & F. FERRAcuTI, THE SUBCULTURE OF
VIOLENCE: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1967).
4 M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE

(1958).
s Mark Twain, a self-appointed expert on thuggees,
also locates homicidal subcultures in the American hinterland. In the process of describing mining communities
in early Nevada, Twain tells us:
If an unknown individual arrived, they did not

My premise is that the murderers used to locate
violent subcultures are atypical of it because they
exceed its norms. Such persons both literally and
figuratively engage in cultural over-kill. The more
representative violence-norm carriers are lower-key
aggressors, whom we rarely meet in police lineups
and crime statistics. This presumptive qualitative
difference is addressed by Straus in relation to
marital violence. Straus refers to a social norm-a
"hitting license"-which does support the punching-pummeling-slapping spouse, but does not support the abuser who inflicts serious injury.6
inquire if he was capable, honest, industrious, buthad he killed his man? If he had not, he gravitated
to his natural and proper position, that of a man of
small consequence; if he had, the cordiality of his
reception was graduated according to the number
of his dead. It was tedious work struggling up to a
position of influence with bloodless hands; but when
a man came with the blood of half a dozen men in
his soul, his worth was recognized at once and his
acquaintance sought.... To be a saloon-keeper and
kill a man was to be illustrious. Hence the reader
will not be surprised to learn that more than one
man was killed in Nevada under hardly the pretext
of provocation, so impatient was the slayer to
achieve reputation and throw off the galling sense
of being held in indifferent repute by his associates.
I knew two youths who tried to "kill their man" for
no other reason-and got killed themselved for their
pains.... The desperado stalked the streets with a
swagger graded according to the number of Isis
homicides, and a nod of recognition from him was
sufficient to make a humble admirer happy for the
rest of the day. The deference that was paid to a
desperado of wide reputation, and who "kept his
private graveyard," as the phrase went,was marked,
and cheerfully accorded .... The best known names
in the Territory of Nevada were those belonging to
these long-tailed heroes of the revlver.... There
was a long list of them. They were brave, recklis
men, and traveled with their lives in their hands.
To give them their due, they did their killing mainly
among themselves, and seldom molested peaceable
citizens, for they considered it small credit to add to
their trophies so cheap a bauble as the death of a
man who was "not on the shoot," as they phrase(]
it. They killed each other on slight provocation, and
hoped and expected to be killed themselve.s-for
they held it alnmost shame to die otherwise than
"with their boots on," as they expres.sed it.
M. TwAIN, ROUGHING IT 339,340-41,343,344-45 (1872).
Though the phenomenon described in this quote is
clearly subcultural, even Twain (who is given to hyperboles) does not assert that "long-tailed hernes of the
revolver" were represcntative of early Nevada citizenry.
The difference between a frontier mining town and a
modern slum is that in the folrmer, extreme violence
practitioners were admired, whereas in the latter, their
deviance is merely considered less extreme than in middle
class circles.
6 M. STRAuS, R. GFt.I.tss & S. STEISNMrTZ, BEHINI)
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Extreme violent offenders are both cultural
products and legitimate subjects of clinical inquiry.
In tracing extreme violent behavior, clinicians are
extra-sensitive to unrepresentative early socialization experiences which created personal dispositions fatefully congruent with violence-permissive
prescriptions. The link between early personal experience and subsequent norm-adoption can be
visualized in various ways. One way is to see overdetermined norm-adopters eagerly grasping for violence-norms while those with representative early
social experiences respond to such norms more
casually. Another image is that of the brain as a
prism of varying complexity, which can transmit
or project norms in larger-than-life fashion. The
more facets the prism contains, the more we expect
it to distort. Its complexity is influenced by personal alienation, trauma-induced cumulated rage,
a need to compensate for low self-esteem, suspicion,
fear, egocentricity, insensitivity, limited verbal
skill, or structural neurological factors, such as
those that transmute implanted rabbits into tigers.
The diagnosis of such ingredients is a clinical task,
but it can assist the subculture theorist. Among
other things, it is easier to validate subcultural
theory if we deploy in depth tests (such as projective instruments) with people who we suspect are
violence-predisposed norm adopters, while we poll
more routine clients of the subculture with situationally-related attitude measures.
Returning to the issue of what is representative
versus idiosyncratic, the topographic high points of
our violence charts can be seen as both typical and
atypical. On one hand, concentrations of extreme
violence-practitioners are indicators of subcultures
because they are made up of persons who dramatically translate norms into conduct. On the other
hand, such peaks are populated by persons whose
clinical syndromes reflect anomie and who are
subcultural mutations. Such syndromes are also
less idiosyncratic than those of the typical patient
in therapy and are therefore theoretically more
relevant, because they permit interfacing between
clinically-oriented and societally-oriented scientists.
So far, I have implied that the interface between
personality and culture in the genesis of violence
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has been short-changed by the culturists. I now
turn to some core assumptions of clinical science
which culturists legitimately criticize as gratui-

tously polarizing. Two such assumptions are (1)
the formula of "violent impulsivity," and (2) the
diagnosis of pathology among violent offenders.
AGGRESSIVE DRIVE AS AN EXPLANATORY

CONCEPT

Kenneth Moyer states that "drive is frequently
given the status of an intervening variable which
is essentially an expression of ignorance or lack of
concern with what is going on inside the organism.",8 The extreme embodiment of this process is
the psychiatrist in one of Steadman's examples
who argued that a man was dangerous because of
"his obvious" difficulties in controlling his aggressive impulses? If an x-ray machine has been invented that makes such statements defensible, it is
a well-kept technological secret.
From a contextual perspective, the concept of
drive seems to start nowhere and to end diffusely.
Animal analogues are inappropriate. Zoologist S.
A. Barnett, decries this practice: "We can find at
least superficial counterparts of almost any human
conduct if we rummage around the animal kingdom with enough persistence.. ' .. Barnett also deplores fashionable anthropological similes. He
notes that "most of the evidence points to primitive
man as rather peaceful. There have been a few
strenuous efforts to make 1him] out to be violent."'"
The ethological assumption that Barnett proposes-which has the virtue of being both sound
psychology and ecumenical-is that "human conduct is adapted (sometimes maladapted) to different environments; this adaptation takes place during individual development from birth onward.
People who would be pacifists in the Kalahari
desert might behave
quite differently in Calcutta
2
or Canberra.'
It is possible to explain aggressive impulsivity in
social learning terms. For example, Feshbach suggests that "aggressive drive arises from the pairing
of the infliction of injury with counteraggression ... reinforced by cultural norms which
state that retaliation is the appropriate response for
8 Moyer, Internal Impulses to Aggression, 31 N.Y. ACAD.

Sci. TRANSACTIONS 104 (1969).
CLOSED

(1980).
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7 The last item is mentioned as a possible physiological
determinant of instrumental aggression in Moyer, Kind
of Aggression and their Physiological Baiis, 2 Com. BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY 65, 79 (1968).

9Steadman, Psychiatric and Judicial Determinations
of Dangerousness (August, 1972) (paper presented to
Society for the Study of Social Problems).
10Barnett, Ethology and Man: Science or Myth?, 19 DEV.
MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 252, 256 (1977).
1 Id.
12Id. at 257.
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an injured party." He also suggests that "violations
to self-esteem through insult, humiliation, or coercion are powerful elicitors of hostility, probably the
most important source of anger and aggressive
drive in humans."13 This theory of drive has important payoffs. Instead of plugging socialization
into the equation as a unidirectional drive-suppressing or drive-modulating enterprise, it gives
culture a more generic function, one that enhances
as well as reduces violence-potential. In this way,
learning models and drive-control models can be
conceptually combined, though drive is demoted
from an independent variable to a dependent one.
A second issue relates to drive-products-the
presumed indiscriminateness of drive-mediated violence-which are hard to reconcile with the situation-specific patterning of human predations.
There may be episodic psychotic explosions in
which cognition is virtually shut off, but intelligence is certainly a shaping force in most human
violence.
Whatever merit there may be in thinking about
impulsivity and control, such concepts are not selfsufficient. They no more explain violence than does
the labelling of sex offenders as over-sexed or overeaters as hunger-driven. It may be that such thinking is helpful in relation to the mechanics of violence but not with respect to violence-dynamics,
which implies origins, functions, and context.
THE ISSUE OF PATHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE

Offender subpopulations contain an unknown
number of individuals who can be diagnosed as
psychologically disturbed. However, even where
such diagnoses are defensible, this does not mean
that we have either explained violence or understood it. A schizophrenic who assaults people is a
psychotic and is violence-prone. Both facts may
diminish the person's popularity, but the conibination does not make him a violent psychotic. If
the patient obeys voices that tell him to kill, our
understanding increases by considering this fact,
but in most cases the link between behavior and
emotional or cognitive problems is remote.
Kozol, Bucher and Garofalo, who have seen
more than their share of disturbed offenders, write
that "the terms used in standard psychiatric diagnosis are almost totally irrelevant to the determination of dangerousness."' 14 They recall that "our
13Feshbach, Dynamics and Morality of Violence and Aggression: Some P.pychological Considerations, 26 Am. lsYCH.
281, 285 (1971).
14Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosisand Treat-

most serious errors in diagnosis have been made
when we ignored the details in the description of
the assault. How was the victim chosen? Was the
choice specific and meaningful or was it random
and incidental? What was the victim in the aggressor's eyes?" 15
Where alienists proceed as Kozol and his colleagues suggest, centering on violence-relevant data
as well as on pathology-relevant data, conversations with representatives of other disciplines are
facilitated immeasurably. Personality themes that
derive from analyses of violent incidents and from
an understanding of encounters between the offender and his victims provide a reliable data base.
This data base permits experts to sum themes
across scenarios and people, while they can study
incidents in depth over the careers of individual
violent actors. The intersection of such researches
enriches understanding of the occasions for violence, and illuminates the contexts in which violence-prone personalities exhibit their propensities.
PREDICTING VIOLENCE CHRONICITY

The fact that violence-repeaters exist raises the
issue of violence-predictability. "Dangerousness,"
we are assured, "is in the eyes of the beholder."
"Clinicians," we are told, "selfservingly overpredict.' 16 Statistics provide no help, because low
criterion base rates invite an outrageous number of
false positives.' 7
Prediction and chronicity would be separable if
we assumed that violent acts could be accurately
predicted where none had occurred previously, but
no responsible expert claims to be able to identify
high risk groups from among those with no previous history of violence. By the same token, an
established pattern of repeat violence provides assurance of further violence virtually regardless of
other characteristics of the offender. In the first
situation, the chances are that few will act violently, and in the second, that almost everyone
will. Given the state of the prediction art, one-time
offenders (for whom prediction is conventionally
deployed) join the low-risk population.
ment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DEI.NQUENCY 371, 383
(&972).
15 Id.
at 384.
16See Steadman, supra note 9; see also H. STEADMAN &
J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: EXCESSIVE SOCIAL CONTROL OF DEVIANCE

(1974).

17Wenk & Emrich, Assaultive Youth: An Exploratory Study
of the Assaultive ExperienceandAssaultive Potentialof California
Youth Authority Wards, 9 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171 (1972); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence
Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972).
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Saleem Shah has noted that a strangely unexplored prediction arena is that which starts with
the violent offender whom cohort analysts (such as
Wolfgang and his colleagues) have characterized
as "recidivists"-youths who have committed two
predatory offenses, and who may or may not have
engrained personal dispositions toward chronicity.
Such individuals lie midway between the heterogeneous melange of one-time exploders and the
unfortunate chronics for whom prediction comes
too late. 18 The behavior base rate in this group
(violent recidivists who become violent chronics) is
.50 among Wolfgang's thirty-year-olds, which is
encouraging, because we know that "the closer (a
base rate) is to .50 the more useful it will be as a
measure that will predict the behavior."''
My ecumenical theme calls for inclusion of
Gottfredson's recommendation for combining prediction methods that are framed differently. Such
a task can be accomplished in various ways, including the deployment of an actuarial method
to varithat confines its assumption of additivity
20
ables that are clinically relatable.
As a clinician, I take one of my cues from the
process-reactive dimension in schizophrenia, which
employs an actuarial method to distinguish more
serious conditions from less serious ones. 2 1 The
analogue may not be perfect, but it holds on several
counts: (1) no one raises the process-reactive issue
unless concrete behavior justifies a plausible diagnosis-there is no such thing as a "process preschizophrenic"; (2) the less chronic of the two
schizophrenic syndromes, as the term "reactive"
implies, points to precipitating conditions, to stressful environmental impingements-by contrast, the
more serious and patterned syndrome features a
history of adversity, of environmental discontinuity, and maladaptation; (3) the social history variables used to diagnose process schizophrenia cumulate, and the configuration makes sense. Similarly, causal explanations are not preordained: pro18 Shaw, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Conceptual

Predictionand Policy Dilemmas, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A
PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 168 (C. Frederick

ed. 1978).
'9 Hanley, The Gauging of Delinquency Potential, in THr
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JusTi:E 237, 240
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cess schizophrenia is associated with industrialization, but it is also related to chaotic family life, soft
neurological indicators, and vulnerable coping
styles.
We can expect research outcomes that may make
the parallel even closer, because the configuration
of disorganization variables that relates to process
schizophrenia may also predict a prevalent pattern
of violence chronicity. The syndrome would indicate an "anomic violent offender" or an "explosive
drifter." Also, predictors such as truancy, school
failure and gang membership would describe a
"reactive violent youth. ' ' 2 Neighborhood crime
rates, crime-involved siblings, and punitive parents
could characterize a "subcultural violent offender."
Race can be a relevant predictor if it translates
into ghetto subculture; if it does, it should of course
be appropriately labelled.
Thus far, I have used the term "clinical" to
denote "conceptually relatable," as opposed to
"blindly empirical." This inexact word usage is
dictated by the observation that few of the reliable
data recorded in the folders of offenders are clinical
in the sense that they describe an offender's personality. Worse, most violence-related personality variables are not additive. Kozol and his colleagues
make this point, citing Halleck as authority. They
write:
Prediction of dangerousness must ultimately be
based upon an overall subjective impression which
is based upon an understanding of the interrelatedness of many factors.... They do not constitute
a check list, and they are not complete or final.
They are suggestions and reminders to us-not a
questionnaire put to the patient.2
Despite the difficulty posed by contrasting assumptions of statistical additivity and "meaningful
clinical configurations," a formula for combining
prediction technologies can and should be evolved.
Ernst Wenk has written that:
Much prior research has shown that actuarial predictions are more accurate than unaided clinical
judgment. For this reason it would seen a derelic-

'2The most powerful prediction of delinquency chronicity from recidivism in the Philadelphia cohort includes
the. variables "age of first offense" (which may be an
artifact), "highest grade completed," and "number of
20 Gottfredson, Assessment andPrediction Methods in Crime different schools." M. Wolfgang, personal communicaand Delinquency, in TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINtion. With all else constant, such data increase the plauQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967).
sibility of the explanation for violence in A. COHEN,
• Zigler & Phillips, Social I-fectiveness and Symptomatic DELINQUENT BOYS: THE SUBCULTURE OF THE GANG (1955).
2
3See Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, supra note 14, at 384.
Behaviors, 61 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 231 (1960).
(H. Toch ed. 1979) (Base rate information from the
Philadelphia cohort was supplied by M. Wolfgang
through personal communication).
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tion to omit actuarial input. It is equally clear that
the clinical role is also needed because the human
decision-maker contributes the ability to respond to

experienced by the serious offender, and concludes
that:

unique situations, an appreciation of multiple criteria, the possibility of therapeutic input and a
humanizing influence on dccisions. ' 4

[The] cycle of neglect, rejection, transfer, and failure
reinforces [the delinquent's] sense that he belongs
nowhere and fans the alienation that contributes to
violent behavior. The seemingly endless chain of
policemen, probation officers,judges, social workers,
doctors, and correction officers who pass through
his life, rarely to reappear, conditions the child to
expect little from relationships with adults except
professional curiosity, indifference, or interference.
He also learns that he can survive this process
without his worst fears of annihilation being realized, which merely emboldens him. And he may
well have picked up more sophisticated techniques
along the way.... [Clurrent intervention practices
seem to encourage and enhance the Idelinquent
group's destructive potential.2"

Wenk now favors-as do I-the combined procedure Sawyer calls "clinical synthesis," which
Wenk summarizes as "taking a prediction produced mechanically and treating it as a datum to
be combined clinically with other data., 25 Clinical
assessment may be appended to actuarial procedures, subdividing or refining high-risk groups that
surface in statistics, adding meaning and increasing
predictive power. "Adding meaning" is the key
phrase to consider, because clinical assessment reduces the ambiguity of predictors, which is conventionally ignored. For instance, "early separation
from school" does not tell us whether school was
unbearable to the student, the student was unbearable to the school, both, neither, or whether it
"depends on which delinquent we talk about."
Alcohol often contributes to violence in offenders
who drink to excess. If alcohol is a factor, questions
arise as to how and why the variable enters the
equation. Correlations between predictors and criterion behavior do not illuminate the dynamics of
alcoholism among offenders. They don't tell us
whether stress is an antecedent to drinking, nor do
they describe the role of alcohol in the genesis of
violence, which probably varies from offender to
offender.
One final caution: prediction research must first
be pure research. Until clinicians know they can
really predict violence, they cannot let practitioners
base decisions on their findings.
THE IMPACT OF SETTINGS ON THE VIOLENT
OFFENDER

Clinical and sociological perspectives have applied concerns in common. One such concern is for
the impact of settings in which violent or violenceprone offenders are placed. Ignoring setting-impact
can result in serious miscalculations, a fact illustrated by Strasburg's review of how the juvenile
justice enterprise in New York subjects violent
offenders to a revolving door terminating in punitive incarceration. Strasburg views the system as

Strasburg believes that settings designed to control violence somehow contain features that reinforce propensities to violence. Such features include
messages of indifference and rejection, unpredictable and arbitrary response to behavior, ammunition for cynical world views, and happenstance
exercises of authority. Such themes are familiar to
psychologists because they are characteristic of the
home-lives or (non-home-lives) of children who
later manifest aggressivity and other dysfunctional
conduct. These features create a world and emotional climate that, in Strasburg's terms, "alienates." The potency of the alienating features of the
immediate world-as opposed to the larger world
in which many sociologists work-is not only manifest in the home, but also in the schools. Studies of
school disruption have highlighted the positive role
of the "firm, fair, and consistent" principal, as
opposed to the administrator who sets up a miniature criminal justice system, and achieves anarchy
instead.2 In such contexts, "firm, fair, and consistent" describes a climate which is non-violencepromotive-a "bottom line" environment that
does not aggravate the violence problem. Such a
paradigm is harder to design than one might think,
because (as we have discovered with sentencing
reforms) achieving consistency along one variable
often creates inconsistency in another, an effect
which the single-variable expert-such as the lawyer-fails to consider.

26 p. STRASBURG, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS: A REPORT TO
Wenk, The Diagnostic Parole Prediction Index 108 THE FORD FOUNDATION FROM THE VERA INSTITUTE OF
(1979) (mimeographed by Responsible Action, Inc., JUSTICE 125 (1978).
Davis, Cal.).
27 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION,
VIOLENT
25 Id. at 39; Sawyer, Measurement and Prediction, Clinical
SCHOOLS-SAFE ScHooLs: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REand Statistical,66 PsYcH. BULL. 178, 184 (1966).
PORT TO CONGRESS (1978'
2
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VIOLENCE-REDUCING SETTINGS

A violence-reducing climate is more than a nonalienating environment or a sharp departure from
a violence-promotive setting. For the most alienated offenders, who are products of cumulative
antisocial reinforcements, it is clear that a regenerative environment would almost have to be a
total environment which could exert systematic
influences that delinquent egos could not discount,
sabotage, ignore, or evade. Such an environment
must also be nonpunitive, because it must be socially reintegrative, meaning that it must be a
community or gemeinschaft milieu. The realm at
issue is social therapy.
We have long known that the design of resocializing milieus is a multidisciplinary task. Freud saw
this mission as best accomplished by sophisticated
educators. He trained one such man (August Aichhorn) who revolutionized the field. Aichhorn in
turn, trained another young educator (Fritz Redl)
who not only did a superb job of resocializing
violent delinquents in Detroit and Washington,
but also contributed significantly to our understanding of violence.2
A violence-reducing environment would be an
environment that reduces violence-levels of persons
who have already behaved violently. The criterion
of impact is the discrepancy between expected and
actual violence.
We can explore environmental impact whenever
violence-prone groups suffer contrasting fates. Ethical problems are minimized to the degree to which
contextual differences occur naturally or with a
minimum of help. An illustration would be the
school situation mentioned earlier, or changes in
the marital status of violent delinquents, or demographic variations in neighborhoods to which offenders are returned.
Several categories of violence-reducing options
derive from sociological theories. One is Wolfgang's
suggestion that violence subcultures be partially
dispersed. 29 The most obvious result of such an
event would be that the dispersed offender would
no longer be subjected to people urging him to
conform to violence-promotive norms. We may
assume that there are sharp differences in the
degree to which internalized norms can survive in
settings in which they are no longer admired and
2 A. AICHHORN, WAYWARD YOUTH (1935); F. REDL,
WHEN WE DEAL WITH CHILDREN (1966); F. REDL & D.
WINEMAN, CHILDREN WHO HATE (1951).
29 See WOLFGANG

& FERRACUTI, supra note 3, at 310.
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reinforced; the recalcitrance of surviving premises
can be studied over personality types.
Another issue posed by Wolfgang's paradigm
concerns the competitive potential of adoptable
norms in the setting to which the offender is exported. One set of questions relates to the psychological equivalence of norms. We know, for instance, that for some people conformity is relatively
important, while for others the congruence of
norms with pre-existing dispositions is critical. We
also deduce from planned-change theory that the
shock of contrasting norms can be unfreezing while
a gradual bridging along content dimensions (such
as different ways of solving questions of honor) can
promote a sense of safety.*)
A second sociological theory with contextual
implications is Hirschi's control theory. :" This view
suggests that alienated offenders can be reintegrated if they become emotionally attached to lawabiding persons, or if they become involved in
engrossing pursuits that yield meaningful and satisfying rewards. A violence-reducing milieu would
be one that creates and cements personal bonds
between the offender and representatives of nonviolent society, or that gives the offender a stake in
the prosocial world.
The above view is compatible with clinical assumptions, though Redl cautions that seduction is
a two-way street. Reintegration is problematic
where mismatched relationships are change vehicles or where rehabilitative outposts are logistically
vulnerable. A resourceless spouse can be a spectator
or even an accessory to crime; well-conceived therapeutic communities can become swamped or coopted. 2 An offender who operates in two worlds
can evolve a dual lifestyle with crime or reintegration as the sideline.
These ruminations outline ways in which psychological variations can attach to sociological
themes. My last example suggests the possibility of
a converse model, based on a concern of psychologists. This concern focuses on the self-cycling consequences of violence, the ways in which violent
careers can cement and perpetuate themselves.
ao Schein, The Mechanisms of Change, in W. BENNIS, K.
& R. CHIN, THE PLANNING OF CHANGE (2d ed.
1969).
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Bandura calls such processes "maintaining" mechanisms and he includes among them "self-regulatory" mechanisms. Examples of these mechanisms
are positive valuations and self-rewards for violence. • 3
Self-regulatory mechanisms can be attacked by
environments that raise questions about the offender's standards and values and their relationship to behavior. One suggestive example is a
project in Oakland in which violence-prone police
officers were enlisted in an anti-violence campaign
in their department. Police-citizen conflict declined
as a result."4 The goal of this enterprise was to
reverse the polarities of self-reward both for the
individual (who can come to see success in peaceful
resolutions rather than in physical control) and for
the organization (which can supplement cops-androbbers goals with more positive definitions of its
mission).
Sociological critiques can define this sort of approach out of existence by stressing the structural
determinants of violence, and by characterizing
-

people-changing as cosmetic reform.n No ecumenical thrust is evident in such views, though one is
implicit. Macro-theorists and micro-theorists can
raise joint questions about congruence or incongruence of microsettings and macrosettings. Where
normative conflict between the people-changing
milieu and its context exists, it need not be accepted
as inevitable. Reward systems for nonviolent (or
anti-violence) resolutions can be created in organizations as self-reward systems are generated in
groups. More to the point, converts can impact
structure as they become (in Hirschi's terms) committed and involved.36
My pessimistic point about violence-reduction is
that although it would be an easier task if we could
somehow affect the situations in which offenders
offend, we cannot, except in a negative way
through imprisonment or banishment. Our remaining strategy involves changing the offender's
reaction to the temptations, pressures, and challenges that we know he will inevitably encounter,
and this enterprise is one that links social and
clinical theory, knowledge and skills.
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